This paper examines tax revenue projections in Germany for the period 1968 to 2012 with a focus on forecasting rationality. It is shown that tax revenue forecasts for the medium-term are upward biased. Overoptimistic revenue projections are particularly pronounced after the German reunification and reflect upward-biased GDP projections in this period. The predicted tax-GDP-ratio appears to be upward biased, as well. The forecasts are likely to overestimate tax revenues if the predicted tax-GDP-ratio exceeds its structural level of approximately 22 ½ percentage points. The results also indicate that forecast errors of short-term projections for the current year exhibit serial correlation. It is conceivable that the non-rational behaviour can be traced back to the specific institutional setting of revenue forecasting and budgetary planning in Germany.
Introduction
Public budgeting receives increasing attention in the course of the fiscal crisis in the Eurozone and other OECD countries. The Fiscal Compact in the European Monetary Union (EMU) gives rise to a stronger focus on budgetary planning and monitoring at the European level. For signatory EU countries, a newly adopted fiscal rule postulates a tight limit of a structural budget deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product (Art. 5 TSCG 1 ). Accurate revenue forecasts are necessary to meet the budgetary targets. Chatagny and Soguel (2012) show that tax revenue forecast errors influence the budget balance, proba-bly because overestimated revenue projections may be a substitute for explicit deficits in legislative budgets (Bischoff/Gohout 2010) . The analysis and improvement of fiscal planning and revenue forecasting practices is, thus, of interest for the scientific community as well as for policymakers. In Europe, Germany is seen as an example for successful public budgeting and tax revenue forecasting has a long tradition. Since 1955 the Working Group on Tax Revenue  Forecasting (AKS) 2 , an advisory board at the federal ministry of finance, provides official tax revenue forecasts for the purpose of public budgeting in Germany. 3 It is, however, controversial whether tax revenue projections in Germany are unbiased and efficient. Only a few studies analyse the rationality of tax revenue forecasts. A large part of the literature focuses on revenue forecasting at the federal level. According to Heinemann (2006) , the forecasts of the tax-GDP-ratio in the medium-term financial plans at the federal level do not pass standard tests of (weak) rationality. In this line the German Federal Court of Auditors criticised the forecasting quality of the AKS. The forecasts appear to be over-optimistic and the Court proposed to examine the methodology of the AKS (Bundesrechnungshof 2006) . Recent studies, however, did not confirm that tax revenue forecasts in Germany are over-optimistic. These studies state that tax revenue forecasts at the federal level are unbiased in the short-run (Becker/Büttner 2007; Lehmann 2010; Büttner/Kauder 2011) . In a comprehensive study, Gebhardt (2001) examines the forecasting quality of tax revenue projections by the AKS. He stresses that the AKS provides conditional forecasts and that the forecast errors of the AKS may reflect overoptimistic GDP projections or inaccurate revenue estimations of tax policy changes. Recent studies analyse the influence of political factors (Bischoff/Gohout 2010; Büt-tner/Kauder 2011) . Election-motivated politicians may try to manipulate revenue forecasts to increase the probability of re-election. In Germany, however, politicians hardly influence tax-revenue forecasts because the AKS is strongly independent (Büttner/Kauder 2010) . The federal government can, however, influence tax revenue forecasts by biasing the macroeconomic forecast of the government (which is conditional for tax revenue forecasters), or by tax policy changes (Gebhardt 2001) . This study contributes to the discussion on the rationality of German tax revenue projections by examining a new dataset of medium-term tax revenue forecasts over the period 1968 to 2012. I use an established strategy to analyse forecasting rationality as applied by Becker and Büttner (2007) , Lehmann (2010) and Büttner and Kauder (2011) . Contrary to previous research this study does not rely on short-run tax revenue forecasts at the federal level, but analyses medium-term forecasts at the general government level. Additionally, forecasts of GDP growth and the tax-GDP-ratio are examined separately. Different from previous results in the literature, in this paper it is shown that tax revenue forecasts for the medium-term are upward biased. Overoptimistic revenue projections are particularly pronounced after the German reunification and reflect upward-biased GDP projections in this period. The forecasts are likely to overestimate tax revenues if the predicted tax-GDP-ratio deviates from its structural level of approximately 22 ½ percentage points. The results also indicate that forecast errors of short-term projections for the current year exhibit serial correlation. It is conceivable that the non-rational behaviour can be traced back to the specific institutional setting of revenue forecasting and budgetary planning in Germany.
Institutional background and related literature
Since 1955, the AKS conducts tax revenue forecasts for the purpose of budgetary planning in Germany. The AKS meets regularly twice a year. At the end of every year, usually in November, the AKS provides official revenue forecasts for the next year's budget. It includes an update for the expected value of revenues in the current year t and a forecast for the next year (budget planning year) t + 1 (short-run horizon). The tax projections are the predominant component of the revenue-side budget and determine the maximum level of expenditures in the legislative budget under a given fiscal rule. 4 Additionally, since 1968 the AKS produces revenue forecasts for the medium-term budgetary plan (regularly in May). 5 The German federal government introduced mediumterm fiscal planning after the first post-war recession in 1967. In contrast to the federal budget, the medium-term budgetary plan is not adopted by the parliament and not legally binding. It represents, however, planning intentions of the government.
6
The AKS consists of representatives of the federal government, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigen-rat), economic research institutes 7 , the German States (Laender), the German cities council, and the federal statistical office. Before the AKS meetings, the federal government, the German central bank, the Council of Economic Experts and the economic research institutes individually provide unpublished tax revenue projections. All individual projections are, however, based on unique assumptions about the macroeconomic outlook and conditional to this macroeconomic forecast of the federal government. The AKS enjoys a relatively high degree of independence, compared to international standards (Büttner/Kauder 2011) because a large number of non-governmental institutions participate at the AKS meetings. The government would be able to influence the tax revenue projections of the AKS only by a strategic setting of the macroeconomic forecast and by changes in tax policy, which are both conditional for the AKS forecast. Beyond their relationship to the respective macroeconomic outlook, tax projections are based on assumptions about the impact of changes in tax policy and, thus, tax revenue forecast 4 The newly adopted fiscal rule in Germany restricts the structural deficit of the federal budget to 0.35 % of GDP. 5 Specifically, in May the AKS provides forecasts for the current year t, and for the years t + 1, t + 2, t + 3, and t + 4, whereat the period t + 2, t + 3, and t + 4 is classified as the medium-term. Since 2012 the AKS provides forecasts for the medium-term in the November meeting as well (including t + 5). Because of the low number of observations, the present analysis does not take into account recent medium-term forecasts made by the AKS in the November meetings. 6 See Heinemann (2006) , Lübke (2008), and Breuer et al. (2011) 8 The federal government conducts the conditional macroeconomic forecast prior to the AKS meetings and thus may influence the AKS forecast through strategically influencing the business cycle forecast and the macroeconomic projection of relevant tax bases. The VAT revenue forecast is based on the forecast of the level of private consumption. The wage tax is linked to the expected growth rate of the national wage bill, and expected employment. See Körner (1983) , Flascha (1985) and Gebhardt (2001) on the revenue dynamics of selected taxes and on the relationship between specific taxes and their tax bases.
errors may result from erroneous assumptions about tax policy (Auerbach 1999; Gebhardt 2001, and Breuer 2013) . The AKS incorporates revenue effects of changes in tax policy only when the appropriate bill passed the legislative process. Since policy-makers often change the tax law, these changes might significantly influence revenue forecast errors in the future, and particularly in the medium-term. The AKS produces a joint tax revenue forecast at the general government level. Later, the AKS distributes the estimated sum of total tax revenues to the territorial entities, the federal level, the state level and municipalities (regionalization). Unlike previous analyses of revenue forecasts at the federal -or state level (Heinemann 2006; Bischoff/Gohout 2010; Büttner/Kauder 2011) , in this paper I analyse tax revenue forecasts of the AKS at the general government level. I do not analyse forecast errors at the federal or state level to abstract from changes in the regional distribution of tax revenues. Further, contrary to previous research, I extend the forecast horizons and include projections of the medium-term, not only the short term. Additionally, I distinguish between tax revenue growth rate forecasts made by the AKS and forecasts made by the federal government for nominal GDP growth. Only Heinemann (2006) analyses projections of the tax-GDPratio in the medium-term financial plans of the federal government, however, does not analyse forecasts of the growth rates of tax revenues and GDP separately.
Data and descriptive statistics
After the meeting of the AKS, the federal ministry of finance publishes the results of the official tax revenue forecast and releases a press statement (BMF 1968 (BMF -2012a BMF 1968 BMF -2012b 
The tax revenue forecast error is the difference between the realization and the forecast of the growth rate of tax revenues r for the year t + h at time t:
Finally, the forecast error of the tax-GDP-ratio q is the difference between the tax-GDPratio in year t + h and the forecast of the tax-GDP-ratio in year t for year t + h:
where
indicates the level forecast of the tax-GDP-ratio in year t for year t + h and R t+h /Y t+h is the appropriate realization in year t + h. Figure 1 shows the forecast errors of tax revenue growth forecasts, the appropriate errors of GDP growth projections and the errors of tax-GDP-ratio forecasts. A positive value indicates an underestimation (of tax revenues, GDP or the tax ratio), and a negative value denotes an overestimation. I classify forecast errors of the same forecast made in year t with the number 0 to 4, indicating the forecast horizon h. In this study, the forecast error of the year 1968 with the forecast horizon 4 describes the forecast error of a revenue projection made in the year 1968 and projecting revenues for the year 1972. The German reunification causes a structural break in the time series analysed here. German federal taxes do not distinguish between new and old German Laender. Because of this, forecast errors of forecasts made in a year before reunification, predicting revenues for a year after the reunification, contain a bias. Therefore, I exclude forecasts conducted before 1991 and predicting revenues in periods after 1991 to make sure that the results are not driven by the structural break of the German reunification. I distinguish between two periods: (1) the pre-reunification period 1968-1990 and (2) the post-reunification period, starting in 1991. Table 1 shows standard measures of forecasting quality, the mean error (ME), mean absolute error (MAE), root mean squared error (RMSE) and Theil's (1966) inequality coefficient (U) for the forecast errors of tax revenues, GDP and the tax-GDP-ratio. The mean error shows a negative sign for multi-year forecasts, indicating a propensity to overestimate tax revenue growth rates. A mean error of −0.39 for next-year forecasts of tax revenue indicates that on average the forecasts exceed the actual growth rate of tax revenues by 0.39 percent. Further, an MAE of 5.2 for GDP forecasts over the period t to t + 2 indicates that the nominal GDP growth forecast for this horizon deviates from the realized nominal growth rate over this period by on average 5.2 percentage points (of previous year's GDP). The prediction quality decreases with the forecast horizon h, since the ME, MAE and RMSE increase with h. Theil's inequality coefficient compares the observed mean squared error to the mean squared error of a benchmark forecast. In the case of the tax-GDP-ratio forecast, I define the benchmark projection as the last observed value (as a percentage of GDP) in the year prior to conducting the forecast. In the case of tax revenues and GDP forecasts, I use the average growth rate of tax revenues (or GDP) in the five years before the forecast is conducted. 9 If the coefficient exceeds one, the benchmark forecast would improve the prediction quality of the forecast at the respective horizon. A comparison between the benchmark forecast and the forecast by the AKS shows that the AKS forecast of tax revenue -and GDP growth rates performs better than a simple benchmark forecast of this growth rate. A naïve projection of the tax-GDP-ratio would, however, better match the future tax-GDP-ratio in the mediumterm. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the different forecast errors shown in Figure 1 . The correlation between tax revenue forecast errors and GDP forecast errors are particularly large (column 1). Additionally, the correlation between tax revenue forecast errors and the forecast errors of tax-GDP-ratio forecasts are positive and very pronounced, particularly in the short run (h = 0 and 1), while the correlation between forecast errors of GDP projections and the forecast errors of tax-GDP-ratio forecasts are low, indicating that forecast errors of tax-GDP-ratio forecasts are hardly influenced by GDP forecast errors. Note: The table shows the mean error (ME), mean absolute error (MAE), root mean squard error (RMSE), as well as the Theil's inequality coefficient (Theil's U) for tax revenue forecasts, GDP forecasts, as well as predicted tax-GDP-ratios, with the horizon 0 to 4. Note: The table shows the correlation coefficients between forecast errors of tax revenue forecasts and forecast errors of GDP forecasts (column 1), tax revenue forecast errors and forecast errors of predicted tax-GDP-ratios (column 2), and between forecast errors of GDP forecasts and forecast errors of predicted tax-GDP-ratios (column 3), with the horizon h = 0, ..., 4.
Empirical analysis 4.1 Unbiasedness
The traditional literature on forecast rationality assumes that rational forecasts presuppose unbiasedness and efficiency. 10 An unbiased forecast implies that the mean forecast error is not significantly different from zero. To test for unbiasedness, Holden and Peel (1990) suggest estimating the condition of α 0 = 0 of the following equation:
where e r t,t+h is the forecast error of the h-step ahead forecast of tax revenue growth
at time t and r t,t+h denotes the realized tax revenue growth rate at time t + h. I apply equation (4) for the analysis of tax revenue growth forecasts, GDP growth forecasts and forecasts of the tax-GDP-ratio. The forecasts are unbiased if the null-hypothesis of unbiasedness (α 0 = 0) cannot be rejected.
Weak rationality
To test for (weak) rationality (Feenberg et al. 1989) , models in the tradition of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) use the following equation:
where r f t,t+h
indicates the h-step ahead revenue growth forecast at time t, and u t is an error term which coincides with the forecast error when the forecast is unbiased (Mocan/Azad 1995) . I rearrange (5) to obtain the forecast error on the left-hand side:
Weak rationality requires that α 0 = 1 − α 1 = 0. While a positive (or negative) coefficient α 0 suggests a tendency towards under-(or over-) estimation, the coefficient (1 − α 1 ) indicates a relationship between the forecast and the forecast error. The forecasts are (weakly) rational, if the individual null hypothesis α 0 = 1 − α 1 = 0 cannot be rejected.
10 Newer literature provides explanations for the existence of a rational bias in forecasts (Laster et al. 1999 and Eliott et al. 2005) . For example, if publicity is part of the loss function, it is possible that forecasters have incentives to provide particularly optimistic or pessimistic forecasts so that the range of competing forecasts may increase (e. g. Laster et al. 1999 and Ottaviani 2006) . I would not suggest that this is applicable in the case of the AKS, particularly because the AKS is the only established institution providing tax revenue forecasts in Germany during the observed period and because competing institutions are used to participate in the AKS. The economic research institutes sometimes provide alternative tax revenue forecasts, however, not over the full sample and not at the same time so that comparable alternative forecasts are hardly available and have a different forecast horizon. This is because all research institutes that participate in the AKS have a commitment not to publish tax revenue forecasts in the period before and after the AKS meetings. Additionally, the individual tax revenue forecasts by the institutes that participate in the AKS are not publicly available. I guess that these agreements are supposed to avoid a possible strategic rational bias in competing revenue forecasts.
Strong rationality
Strong rationality implies that the forecast is unbiased and efficient. An efficient forecast contains all relevant information that is available at the time of the forecast (Nordhaus 1987) . I test for efficiency by using equation (7), where X i,t represents n variables assumed to be part of the information set of the forecaster at time t: e r t,t+h
If we cannot reject the null-hypothesis (β i = 0), the forecasts r f t,t+h are efficient and, thus, (strongly) rational. X i,t include the previous year's forecast error for the currentyear forecast (forecast revision for year t − 1) to test for serial correlation of forecast errors. Additionally, I include the projected tax-GDP-ratio. Moreover, it is conceivable that forecasts appear to be particularly optimistic in a certain macroeconomic environment, e.g. when budget deficits are large, or in times of economic crisis. Particularly in times of large budget deficits, governments might tend to produce over-optimistic forecasts. To control for these factors, I additionally include the (previous year's) general government deficit (as a percentage of GDP), as well as the (lagged) real GDP growth rate, and assume that both variables are part of the information set of the forecasters at the time when the forecast is made. Further, I include dummy-variables capturing the institutional and political influence, as e.g. in election years, under different parties in government, as well as after German unification and during the European Monetary Union (EMU). Table 3 shows the results of equation (4), the coefficients (α 0 ) and the respective standard errors. The coefficients for h > 0 are negative, indicating that the AKS overestimated tax revenues for multi-year forecasts during the period 1968-2011. Forecasts with multi-year forecast horizons are prone to autocorrelation (McNees 1978) . Therefore I use autocorrelation-consistent (Newey-West) standard errors, reported in parentheses.
Results

Unbiasedness
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Panel A) shows that tax revenue forecasts for the current and the subsequent year are unbiased, however, the mean error for the horizon h = 4 is 7.2 % and significant at the 10 % level (row no. 5). The results are not very pronounced before reunification, but statistically significant for medium-term forecasts after 1991. After reunification, the forecasts overestimated tax revenues on average by 10.9 % at the end of the forecast horizon (h = 4). The results are, however, sensitive to sample variations. Particularly at the beginning of the sample in the late 1960s and early 70s, as well as at the end of 11 The election dummy takes the value of 1 if the forecast is conducted in the year after a regular election year. The dummy indicating the influence of partisan cycles takes the value of 1 if the social democratic party (SPD) is the major party in the government and zero otherwise. I control for the influence of German reunification or European monetary union with a dummy for years after reunification in 1999 or the currency union in 1999, respectively. 12 The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate the presence of positive autocorrelation, particularly for medium-term forecasts. the sample after 2003, the forecasts show a tendency towards underestimating growth rates of tax revenues. 13 To show additionally sample variations, the results of recursive estimations of equation (4) for different forecast horizons (h = 1, ..., 4) can be found in the electronic appendix to this paper. 14 The GDP projections of the federal government have been overoptimistic during the period 1968 and 2011 as well (row no. 6 to 10 of Table 3 ). The overoptimistic bias of the GDP forecast is particularly pronounced and statistically significant at conventional 13 Note that the results of related analyses that often rely on a different sample starting in the 1970s are hardly comparable to the results shown in this paper. Excluding the late 1960s and recent observations, the tendency towards over-optimism turns out to be even more pronounced. 14 It is shown that for short-run revenue forecasts, the coefficient α 0 does not turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels for any sample variation. Forecasts for the medium-term start (e. g. h = 4) with a positive coefficient α 0 , indicating that the AKS underestimated tax revenues at the beginning of the sample in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The coefficient decreases in the 1970s and changes the sign in the 1980s, reflecting a tendency towards overestimation in this period. The coefficient increases again after 2003, indicating that the forecasts are less overoptimistic after 2003. After reunification, the coefficient α 0 appears to be negative at all horizons. The forecasts are particularly prone to over-optimism in the post-reunification episode and the results are significant already for the short-run (h = 1), but particularly striking for medium-term forecasts. The tendency towards over-optimism decreases after 2003, but the overoptimistic bias for multi-year forecasts (horizon 2, 3 and 4) is statistically significant for the entire post-reunification sample. levels only after reunification, indicating that the forecast uncertainty of GDP projections after German reunification increased and the positive expectations in the aftermath of this event have not been realized. The bias is significant after reunification, already for forecasts with the horizon h = 1 (short-run). It seems that the overoptimistic GDP projections after reunification influenced the overoptimistic tax revenue forecasts, so that the forecast of the tax-GDP-ratio does not exhibit a significant bias in this period (row no. 11 to 15).
Panel C) of Table 3 shows the results of equation (4) for the tax-GDP-ratio. The results suggest that we can reject the hypothesis of unbiasedness for forecasts of the tax-GDPratio with the horizon 3 and 4 (row no. 14 and 15). The projected tax-GDP-ratio, thus, exhibits an overoptimistic bias. The bias increases with the forecast horizon. At the end of the forecast horizon (h = 4) the AKS overestimated the tax-GDP-ratio by 0.64 percentage points. This result is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Table 4 reveals the results of the tests for weak rationality. Row no. 1 to 5 show the results for tax revenue forecasts, and row no. 6 to 10 depict the results for GDP growth projections of the federal government. The results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis of (weak) rationality for both, tax revenue and GDP projections, at all horizons (h = 0, 1, ... 4). The forecasts of the tax-GDP-ratio, however, do not pass the tests of are computed using the delta method. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
Weak rationality
weak rationality. The respective F-statistics reject the hypothesis that α 0 = 1 − α 1 = 0 at conventional levels (p-value < 10 %). The results are stronger for medium-term forecasts, but even short-run forecasts of the tax-GDP-ratio are not (weakly) rational (row no. 11). Equation (6) implies that if the tax ratio forecast denoted by the coefficient − α 0 1−α 1 is exceeded, the forecast is likely to overestimate the tax-GDP-ratio. According to the results in Table 4 , this coefficient turns out to be close to the historical trend of the tax-GDP-ratio of 22 ½ percentage points. Table 5 shows the results of equation (7), where X i,t includes variables that are part of the information set when the forecasts are made. I include the previous year's forecast error for the current-year forecast (forecast for year t−1 made in t−1) to test for serial correlation of forecast errors. It is possible that forecasts appear to be particularly optimistic in a certain macroeconomic environment, e. g. when deficits are large, or GDP growth is low. To control for these factors, I include the (previous year's) general government deficit, the (previous year's) GDP growth rate, as well as the predicted tax-GDP-ratio, which are part of the information set of the forecasters at time t. To control for other factors that might influence the forecasting quality and that are known at the time of the forecast I include dummies for election years, partisan cylces and other factors (equivalent to Heinemann 2006, I include a dummy taking the value of one in the period after the German reunification, as well as a dummy for the period after the introduction of the Euro).
Strong rationality
The AKS forecasts of tax revenues do not pass this test for (strong) rationality. The results in Table 5 suggest that forecast errors of projections for the short-run (h = 0 and 1) exhibit positive serial correlation (column 1 and 2). It is, thus, likely that the AKS forecasts for the short run are overoptimistic, when the forecast of last year's tax revenues turned out to be overoptimistic as well. Serial correlation in revenue forecast revisions seems to be a prevalent issue. Auerbach (1999) pointed to the appearance of serial correlation of tax revenue forecast revisions in the United States. To avoid large forecast revisions, it is conceivable that the AKS tends to smooth revisions over time, because revisions of official revenue projections might be a challenge for budgetary planning institutions and could be part of the loss function of fiscal forecasters. For multi-year forecasts, however, the results do not indicate that previous errors determine future forecast errors. Nevertheless, there are factors that explain the forecast error, particularly in the medium term. The predicted tax-GDP-ratio turns out to be significantly correlated with the forecast error of tax revenues with the same horizon in most of the specifications, indicating that the predicted tax-GDP-ratio influences the tax revenue forecast error. Tax revenue forecasts are likely to overestimate tax revenues if the projected tax-GDP-ratio exceeds − α 0 1−α 1 . The critical tax ratio − α 0 1−α 1 turns out to be close to the structural tax-GDP-ratio of approximately 22 ½ percent of GDP. Further, as it is shown in Table 3 , tax revenue forecasts are particularly overoptimistic in the aftermath of the German reunification. One of the coefficients for the post 1991-period (German reunification) or the post-1999 period (Euro) turns out to be statistically significant for every multi-year forecast, while the effects of the influence of elections and the party in government do not seem to systematically influence the results. Other results, as the relationship between the tax revenue forecast error and the predicted tax-GDP-ratio remain robust, with or without controlling for political Note: Dependent variable: Tax revenue forecast error (percent). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
and institutional variables. 15 The p-value of the appropriate F-statistics shows that we can reject the hypothesis of (strong) rationality at every horizon h > 0. The results are particularly pronounced for multi-year forecasts, but statistically significant for short-run forecasts, as well.
Determinants of forecast errors
The results, as presented in Tables 4 and 5 imply that the AKS fails to forecast tax revenue growth rates efficiently. It is, however, conceivable that other unknown determinants influence the forecast error (unobserved variable bias). To account for other factors and to analyse the determinants of tax revenue forecast errors, I estimate equation (7), where X i,t includes determinants of tax revenue forecast errors, known or unknown a time t. I include the respective GDP forecast error of the GDP forecast by the government with the same forecast horizon, as well as tax policy changes (as a percentage of previous Source: BMF (1968 -2012c , own calculations. years' tax revenues) to account for the influence of political and economic factors. Both variables are not available at the time when the forecast is made, but certainly influence the forecast error of tax revenue forecasts. 16 The variables are influenced by decisions of the federal government, so that it is worthwhile to analyse whether the test for efficiency shows the same results after controlling for these factors. Figure 2 depicts the estimated influence of tax policy changes on tax revenues, based on published calculations by the German federal government. 17 Table 6 summarizes the estimated influence of potential determinants on the tax revenue forecast errors. It turns out that the GDP forecast error positively influences the tax revenue forecast at every horizon. The coefficient is approximately one, what is in line with assumptions about the GDP elasticity of tax revenues.
18 Moreover, changes in tax policy affect the forecast error positively. The estimated coefficient, however, turns 16 In this line Büttner and Kauder (2011) analyze the influence of GDP forecast errors, as well as changes in tax policy, on short-term revenue forecast errors. 17 Since 1967, the German federal government estimates the impact of tax policy changes on revenues at the general government level and publishes the estimations in the annual reports of the federal ministry of finance (BMF 1968 (BMF -2012c . For every year t, I calculate the sum of the estimated impact of changes in tax policy and the estimated impact per (last year's) tax revenue. 18 Girouard and André (2005) analyze the elasticity of taxes with respect to the output gap. According to them, the elasticity is above 1 for direct taxes in Germany, but 1 for indirect taxes. Breuer (2013) finds an elasticity of approximately 1 for aggregate tax revenues.
out to be low, indicating that the estimated impact of tax policy is overestimated. 19 The integration of GDP errors and tax policy changes, however, does not diminish the effect of serial correlation in current year forecast errors (column 1). Moreover, the estimated tax-GDP-ratio has a significant positive influence on the forecast error, indicating that an above-average forecast of the tax-GDP-ratio increases the likelihood of an overoptimistic tax revenue forecast, even after controlling for GDP growth forecast errors and tax policy changes. These findings suggest that GDP forecast errors, as well as tax policy changes (tax cuts), do not explain the forecast error associated with the predicted tax-GDP-ratio. The effects of (previous year's) deficit and growth, however, does not have a significant impact on the tax revenue forecast error. The partisan dummy turns out to be slightly significant in some specifications, indicating that tendency toward overestimation of revenues is less pronounced under left-wing governments, compared to right-wing governments, however, the coefficient is significant only for the horizon 0 and 2. Further, as stated in Table 5 , the dummies for unification or the introduction of the Euro turn out to be significant, meaning that forecast errors have been particularly large after 1991 or 1999.
Conclusion
In the present paper I analyse the forecasting performance of tax revenue projections in Germany. As one result, tax revenue forecasts and the forecasts of tax-GDP-ratios are over-optimistic for projections in the medium-term. Underlying GDP projections are prone to over-optimism in the medium-term, too, a bias that is particularly pronounced in the period following the German reunification. The tests in this paper rely on the implicit assumption of symmetric loss functions, meaning that negative and positive forecast errors have the same weight (optimistic forecast errors are as costly for the forecaster as pessimistic forecast errors). Recent literature however provides explanations for the existence of asymmetric loss. To allow the loss function to be asymmetric, Eliott (2005) propose the estimation of an asymmetry parameter (In this line Chatagny/Siliverstov 2013, analyze tax revenue forecasts in Switzerland under asymmetric loss). It is, however, not easy to apply this framework to the context of tax revenue forecasts by the AKS in Germany. On the one hand, the negative mean error of tax revenue forecasts indicates that forecasters are more likely to overestimate revenues. On the other hand, this overestimation has to a large part been driven by overoptimistic GDP projections rather than asymmetric loss, given that the AKS forecast is a conditional forecast based on assumptions about the macroeconomic outlook and tax policy changes.
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19 It is conceivable that the government overestimates the revenue effect of policy changes and probably underestimates the potential feedback effects of tax changes on GDP. It is thus not possible to account perfectly for the influence of tax policy changes on revenue forecast errors with the measure of tax policy as used here. For the regressions in Table 6 , I e. g. assume that tax policy in year t influences tax revenue forecast errors of the same year (column 1). For forecasts with the horizon 1, I assume that next years tax policy changes influence the forecast error (of forecasts made in year t). For medium-term forecasts, I assume that all tax policy changes in the forecast horizon influence the forecast error, but exclude policy changes in a year when the forecast is made. This treatment relies on the assumption that the tax revenue forecasts do not include policy changes for the next year, because these policy changes regularly didnt pass the parliamentary process at the time when the AKS meets (regularly in May). 20 See Don (2001) and Gebhardt (2001) on the issue of conditional forecasts. The correlation coefficient between GDP forecast errors and tax revenue forecast errors is large and the overoptimistic bias of tax revenue projections disappears after controlling for GDP growth forecast errors for the full sample. The overoptimistic bias of tax revenue forecasts, as well as GDP projections is particularly pronounced after the German reunification. I suggest that the uncertainty about potential GDP growth in the aftermath of the German reunification contributed to the overoptimistic bias of the GDPand tax revenue forecasts, and that a decrease in trend growth rates affected GDP forecast errors for projections in the medium-term during this period. It is, however, also possible that the federal government decided to overestimate GDP and to improve fiscal forecasts in the medium-term budget outlook to cover the true costs of the German reunification. In this case it could be conceivable that the loss function of forecasters of the GDP growth projections has been asymmetric. This is however only one possible explanation for a rational bias. The propensity towards overestimation decreased after 2004. Upward-biased GDP-projections and tax revenue forecasts may thus reflect a transitory phenomenon. To avoid a suspicion that the government influences tax revenue forecasts for a political purpose by strategically manipulating the conditional macroeconomic fore-cast, it would be reasonable to rely on a more independent macroeconomic projection and by providing more independence to the AKS (Heinemann 2006) . For example, the independent economic research institutes that are involved in the 'Gemeinschaftsdiagnose' (GD) 21 prepare a macroeconomic forecast just before the government present its macroeconomic forecast, which is used by the AKS. 22 It would be worthwhile to use the joint economic forecast as the conditional GDP growth projection for the purpose of fiscal planning in Germany to avoid a possible political influence. Additionally, the results in this paper indicate that short-run forecasts for the current year exhibit serial correlation. It seems that the AKS tends to smooth forecast revisions over time to avoid large revisions, perhaps because revisions of planned tax revenues are a challenge for budget planning institutions and are part of the loss function of fiscal forecasters. The forecasts of the tax-GDP-ratio fail tests for rationality. If the forecasts of the tax-GDP-ratio deviates from the structural level (of approximately 22 ½ %), the forecasts are likely to over-/underestimate this ratio as well as the growth rate of tax revenues. According to my results, even a naïve projection of the tax-GDP-ratio for the medium term exhibits a better forecast quality than the AKS forecast. Keeping the tax-GDP-ratio constant would improve the forecasting quality of the AKS for multi-annual forecasts, particularly in the medium-term. While the tax-GDP-ratio remains on a relatively constant level of approximately 22.5 percent of GDP in the sample, the AKS predicts increasing tax-GDP-ratios. On average, the predicted tax-GDP-ratio increases by 0.5 percentage points during the 4-year forecast horizon, while the mean forecast error of the tax-GDPratio increases by the same scope (0.0 percentage points for the short run and 0.6 in the medium run, h = 4). I assume that regular tax cuts reduce the tax-GDP-ratio, so that tax policy induces a rational bias, because the AKS is supposed to predict revenues under the assumption of status quo tax law. Even though the AKS has no unique assumptions on the aggregated GDP elasticity of tax revenues (because the AKS provides forecasts only for specific taxes with respect to their corresponding tax base), the AKS implicitly assumes an elasticity of aggregate tax revenues with respect to GDP of greater than 1, since the predicted tax-GDP-ratio increases over time. Predicting increasing tax-GDPratios, while the tax-GDP-ratio remains at constant levels, causes non-rational forecasts, however, given that the AKS provides conditional forecasts and assumes status quo tax law, it is conceivable that some part of the non-rational behaviour of the AKS could be traced back to the institutional setting of fiscal forecasting and the conditions of budgetary planning in Germany.
